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1LIVELIHOOD-ENVIRONMENT-ACCESS-EQUITY
POWER-POSSESSIVENESS-PROFIT
Some Problematic Interactions of Rights.... And Wrongs 
By Reginald Herbold Green
How is it possible to buy or sell the sky 
or the heat of the earth?
- Chief Sealth (Seattle) 
Refusing to sell his 
people's ancestral lands
Our children's children will see this 
and bless heaven.
- W. Shakespeare (Henry VIII)
not only is attacking poverty a moral 
imperative, but it is also essential for 
environmental stewardship.
- World Bank (World Development 
Report 1992)
environmental protection is one area in 
which government most maintain a central role. 
...Strong environmental policies complement 
and reinforce development.
' - ibid
I .
What Are We Talking About?
Environment and ecology are often used as synonymous terms. This is less 
than helpful if it is taken to mean that only material conditions and 
especially those relating to nature are relevant to the environment and to 
environmental protection. Certain type of ecological protection can have 
negative or even disastrous human environmental consequences.
2Livelihoods (or their absence) are an integral part of the human 
environment. They are an equally integral part of the right to 
development. Ecological policy and practice which ignores them is 
normatively problematic. In addition, it is usually unsustainable 
especially by accountable governments unless the livelihoods negatively 
affected are those of small, socially and politically marginal communities.
The reconciliation of the right to development and to livelihood with 
ecological sustainability turns on sustainability. Livelihoods and 
development which are unsustainable are inherently unsatisfactory usually 
for present as well as future generations. This approach — sustainable 
livelihoods and development including sustainable ecological management and 
protection — is conceptual, not a mere word game. It does not eliminate 
conflicts of rights nor the need for trade-offs and compromises but it does 
offer a perspective within which dialogue and reconciliation are much more 
likely to be attainable.
A major problem with the present debate is its tendency to use terminology 
which obscures rather than illuminates, combined with frequent descents 
into diatribes of the deaf rather than dialogue of the concerned.
Listening to the run-up to the Rio Conference the speeches and the 
commentaries strongly suggested that, at least so far as most of the 
political and economic actors were concerned, power, possessiveness and 
profit were the basic concepts being advanced and that they were being 
promulgated from relatively narrow interpretations of different 
speakers/writers own self-interest. That in itself is not unusual - 
negotiations among disinterested parties are very much the exception - but 
combined with terminological and presentational sloppiness it led not to 
any process of parameter setting for negotiation but to formalised rhetoric 
abuse, sanctification of what looked suspiciously like varied self- 
interests and demonisation of those who disagreed. That - as the 
disastrous record of the New International Economic Order non-dialogue 
should warn - is no way to achieve results. As both livelihood 
sustainability and ecological protection matter (not least to each other) 
deadlock is a worst possible result for all parties - a negative sum game.
"Whose rights to what?" is a question which needs posing. At least four 
quite different answer clusters emerge for - the rich North, poor Southern 
countries, poor Southern households and persons/groups with focussed
3general or specific ecological commitments. Each sketch is necessarily on 
grounds of space schematic.
In principle, a fifth perspective - poor Northern households - should be 
equally important. In practice, it is rarely clearly articulated beyond 
specific cases (e.g. loggers threatened by owl protection) and usually 
turns on issues which Northern economies clearly do have the resources to 
resolve consistent with protecting ecology and livelihoods at the same 
time.
The rich Northern perspective is that ecological damage threatens future 
growth or even maintenance of achieved levels of income and amenity and, 
therefore, must be halted or reversed. It believes this to be technically 
feasible - largely within existing technology frontiers - at substantial 
but not non-financeable cost to itself in the North and calls on (demands?) 
the South to carry out a similar exercise (largely out of its own 
resources) in its countries.
The North does admit most past ecological damage was done by itself - out 
of ignorance and lack of then available protective (or alternative) 
technology but at least implicitly argues that present and future dangers -
e.g. to forests, in respect to carbon dioxide emissions, levels of 
fluorocarbon usage, extinction of species - are in the South. There is 
something in the second strand of this argument and in the North's parallel 
contention that its act - if not wholly together yet - is beginning to come 
to grips with ecological damage control/reversal. The areas in which the 
latter contention is weakest are, however, forest conservation/expansion 
and carbon emission taxation which square oddly with ferocious criticism of 
Southern logging and air pollution.
The North's basic interpretation of the global obligation to achieve 
ecological stability/recovery is one in which each country is primarily 
responsible for all aspects in its own territory with some type of 
enforcement (tariffs? import bans?) against backsliders. It does - via 
free trade - propose to supply ecologically sound technology to the South, 
via enterprises and at a profit as well as to take a lead in relevant 
research - again primarily via enterprises and charged up to/profit from in 
patented/intellectual property protected legal monopoly/oligopoly product 
sales. On a grace and favour basis some joint financing of costs in 
Southern territory protection is recogn sd as desirable.
4The economic logic of this approach is not impeccable. In the case of 
external economies (diseconomies) the "beneficiary pays" ("polluter pays") 
principles do not necessarily give territorially bounded results — 
especially if enterprises based in one country operate on a basis doing 
global ecological damage in another. Nor are "ability to pay" and 
"avoidance of regressive taxation" principles unknown to economies even if 
they appear to be almost totally left out of account in the Northern 
stance.
The poor Southern country perspective (most forcefully argued by larger, 
less poor Southern countries, e.g. Brazil, Malaysia but clearly - if less 
abrasively backed - by large, very poor, industrialising economies, e.g. 
China, India) has three somewhat disparate strands. The first is a root 
and branch cutting down of the Northern case; the second a defence of its 
own commitment to sustainability; the third a demand for cost sharing on a 
progressive taxation basis.
The basic contention is that most ecological damage and most present risks 
have been caused by Northern actions - not simply past but also present 
(e.g. present comparative CO2 emissions and forest absorptions per capita 
levels. Linked to this is the contention that these practices were in 
large part necessary to achieve development and that to forbid them to the 
South is to forbid Southern development whether or not that is the Northern 
intention. Like its notorious predecessor, the Club of Rome's "Limits to 
Growth" exercise, the North's Rio stance is seen as a "what we have we 
hold" and "the devil take the hindmost" approach seeking to freeze global 
hierarchies and inequalities.
The second strand is an assertion that Southern governments are committed 
to environmental protection even if their priorities are not identical to 
Northern but are also committed to national sovereignty in identifying, 
articulating and implementing. The implication - sometimes spelled out - 
is that Northern ecologists do not understand Southern environmental 
problems, priorities or policies adequately and that both they and Northern 
governments are behaving in a neo-colonialist mode which is unacceptable 
whatever its objectives.
The last strand is to argue for a common global environmental strategy 
(including Southern priorities) to be financed on a cost sharing basis with 
charges proportional to output per capita and territorial programmes funded
5on the basis of need. This might or might not be a way forward except that 
the Southern definition of environment at this point embraces the whole 
global economic environment.
Clearly there are links. For example, one cause of excess and ecologically 
unsound resource exploitation is debt servicing and another is worsening 
terms of trade. Therefore, debt relief (whether broadly linked to national 
environmental policy or to an agreed project package) is discussable. 
Experience has shown that general terms of trade manipulation is a non­
starter politically whatever the economic case (or lack of one). Equally, 
it is a fact that human poverty leads to the creation of ecological poverty 
and that soil conservation/agro forestry/anti-desertification packages can 
reasonably be financed under ecology/poverty reduction twin umbrellas. But 
putting the whole array of poverty reduction (much less national product 
per capita disparity reduction) under the ecology rubric appears unlikely 
to be functional.
The Southern poor household position is by no means necessarily the same as 
that of Southern governments, especially relatively unaccountable ones 
responsive to narrow constituencies, influencers or paymasters. Especially 
- but not only - perceptions alter priorities and nowhere in this more true 
than in respect to livelihoods of poor households.
Clearly any Southern poor household position is largely an artificial 
construct. Poor household groupings are usually locally and conceptually 
limited although some national alliances backed by domestic NGO support 
groups with professional expertise are emerging (e.g. India, Philippines, 
Malaysia). Globally, all of their organisational (as opposed to 
individual) spokespersons are voices for not of the globally voiceless and 
only on land and the overlapping indigenous minority rights issues have 
these voices tended to focus on items on the ecological agenda.
Poor households do care about environment including ecology. The greatest 
single cluster of concerns turns on livelihood sustainability and the 
second on access to water, fuel and - at least in densely populated areas - 
sanitation. Perceptions of what is ecologically damaging may be 
'unscientific' (if that is a fair description of observation based on 
reflection on perceived experience) and narrowly bounded both contextually 
and technologically. They are, however, genuine and often acute.
6Poor households in general would not deny - and can identify - practices 
conducive to environmental degradation and practices not (or no longer) 
carried out which would reduce environmental damage and future livelihood 
risk. To them the basic reason for the apparent contradiction between 
perception and practice is self-evident - need. For example, if long 
rotation preserves fertility for the future but yields starvation now it 
will be abandoned. If the workload to terrace hill farms is beyond 
household capacity (or lack of secure tenure makes such investment highly 
risky) then terraces will not only not be extended but in many cases will 
not be maintained no matter how traditional they once were (e.g. Philippine 
Cordillera).
This perception is not anti-ecological but rather ranks survival and a 
modest sufficiency as the top household environmental priorities. To blame 
the poor households for the very considerable ecological damage they do 
(including a plurality of deforestation in Sub-Saharan Africa and erosion 
causing cultivation in Southeast Asian hill country) is normatively 
unappealing and operationally stale, flat and unprofitable. If the means 
to behave in an eco-friendly manner reducing livelihood risks consistent 
with achieving household incomes above a social poverty line are made 
available most such households will respond. How, is a complex, contextual 
problem. For example, many such households are well disposed to tree 
planting - as windbreaks, for fuel and building materials, for household 
fuel and fodder, for cash income - but few welcome large mono-tree stands 
tailored to urban fuel or hillside/watershed conservation needs designed 
without reference to their livelihood requirements.
Gender aspects of environmental protection certainly do exist. For 
example, because providing water and fuel are usually among women's 
responsibilities in poor Southern rural households, degradation of tree and 
bush cover and related sinking of the water table have a disproportionately 
negative impact on their workload. So too their responsibility for 
providing foods means that soil degradation and erosion increase the total 
burden on their time. In Africa, at least, terracing and tree planting 
tend to be on the male side of most divisions of labour so women would bear 
a portion of the costs disproportionately low relative to benefits and men 
vice versa.
7Most women - like most rural people - are aware of the poverty links of 
ecological damage and do seek to prevent ecological looting by outsiders - 
including commercial forestry endangering food and fuel supply in Indian 
and Philippine "tribal" areas. On the other hand in the context of present 
poverty and narrow survival margins women - like men - necessarily choose 
to put present survival first sometimes with devastating ecological results 
from loss of trees and bushes or soil or both. Analogously, men whose 
household survival depends on off farm low wage employment will skimp on 
terracing and soil protection not because they are unaware these actions 
put future food supples at risk but because they see no other option.
These contextual issues are hard to build into a conceptual framework 
albeit a check-list of ecological protection/degradation costs/benefits for 
men, boys, women and girls could be constructed in most countries. What 
one has conceptually is rather different and rather peculiar.
The dominant theme is that women in general care about ecology and its 
protection and that men in general do not because women are carers, 
nurturers, protectors and men profiteers, exploiters, users. This 
transformation of "children, kitchen, church" into a positive eco-friendly 
stereotype is of very dubious desirability as a means to empowering women 
or reducing gender typing. Even assuming that women are inherently carers 
independent of social expectations and constraints the analogy from 
children and the sick to trees and crocodiles (let alone the ozone layer 
and the greenhouse effect which are at a very different level of 
abstraction from visible corporeal reality) seems problematic. But, more 
to the immediate point this approach starts at the wrong end by not 
identifying what costs/risks particular women in particular contexts 
perceive; how they believe they could reduce them and what they see as the 
requirements (time? money? tools? knowledge?) to do so.
Some generalisations would be practicable and, even when that was not the 
case, a foundation would be laid for environmentally friendly initiatives 
which would be supported/carried out by women (who could thereby empower 
themselves) because they were both possible and contributory to enhanced 
livelihoods, reduced workloads, lower future risks, better human 
environment as perceived by them.
The eco-committed perception focuses on damage and risk reduction - whether 
in general or in a particular sector. Like any single issue or issue
8cluster focus it treats other goals as inherently subordinate - though not 
necessarily invalid or beyond discussion/negotiation. That is not an 
inherent objection - so long as a set of goals and programmes are valid it 
is desirable that some people and organisations give them a dynamic and 
cutting edge by focussing their objectives on forwarding them. It becomes 
unhelpful only when somewhat extreme (by general ecological movement 
standards) positions (e.g. viewing tse tse flies as acceptable fauna 
defenders), totally inadequate objective comprehension (e.g. viewing co­
existence of crocodiles and children in the same body of water as 
practicable) or impervious to other valid goals' claims (e.g. land for food 
as opposed to forests) makes them unable to negotiate attainable trade-offs 
and/or infuriates persons, institutions and countries with other priorities 
(e.g. reduction of poverty, reducing aid dependence by enhancing exports).
A more basic problem relates to risk, cost and temporal urgency evaluation. 
On most issues the direction of negative change is demonstrable. The speed 
and severity is much more problematic on known data. So too are 
evaluations of costs, positive results, timetables and sometimes even 
directions of results of proposed changes. For two reasons the 
ecologically committed tend to underplay uncertainty and pose catastrophic, 
immediate risk scenarios:
a. carefully outlined limits of uncertainty do not mix easily with 
presenting a simple, saleable message or mobilising will and resources 
to respond to it;
b. catastrophic risk (if significantly different from zero in probability) 
which cannot be averted after data and analysis become precise does 
justify high cost, uncertain degree of gain, immediate action and on at 
least global warming and ozone layer there is a relatively strong case 
that catastrophic risk does exist and - because of lags in impact of 
changed policies even if implementation began at once - immediate 
action to counter it is needed.
Unfortunately overcertainty/oversimplification of presentation against well 
briefed opponents can lead to loss of credibility rather than agreed 
initial steps. Further, the global warming counter-measures are such that 
while an early start is needed a 'big bang' one is less evidently essential 
(or attainable). Beyond those too, it is arguable fear of the consequences 
of catastrophic risk will not mobilise support as well as less apocalyptic
9and more pragmatic arguments (e.g. for species diversity protection to 
yield gene and product banks and tourism bases).
The basic issues in each case except perhaps the ecological are power, 
possession and profit. The poor household's concerns are to earn a 
livelihood, to have possession of the means to do so (including secure 
access to usable land in rural cases) and to profit from - inter alia - 
ecological protection. The Northern and Southern governmental cases are 
even easier to translate into p-p-p terms. The ecological stance is in one 
sense about power over what is done and possession of the agenda albeit the 
profit is not material.
That summary is not to be seen either as denigration or as an epitaph on 
the possibility of action. To possess the means and to have the power to 
profit from efforts to earn a reasonable livelihood whether as a household, 
an enterprise or a country is not merely understandable, it is also 
laudable so long as it is neither self destructive nor based on 
impoverishing others. Further, all negotiations about power, possession 
and profit do involve divergent interest and successful outcomes depend on 
trade-offs and compromises so that each party is reasonably satisfied 
(barring naked coercion which is not a practicable route to environmental 
protection). That is a context in which positive sum games can be played - 
clashing over non-negotiable issues of principle is not. The issue is not 
the desirability of principles but the practical, attainable means to make 
progress in implementing them.
The present form of presenting perceptions and cases does not appear to be 
particularly well suited to a non-perjorative examination of power- 
principle-possession aimed to seeing how sustainability and livelihood 
(environment/right to development) can be furthered jointly. Even assuming 
each case has been set out as a bargaining platform (pretty certainly true 
of the official Southern one) the mutual reactions to the other cases has 
been too strident and too little negotiation focused.
One clear substantive problem area is that of technology to limit emissions 
damaging to the ozone layer and/or contributing to global warming. If such 
technology as exists is not put into general (global) use and more 
developed the outlook for both ozone and temperature is bleak. But the 
technology is costly in one and probably two senses. The first is initial 
purchase. Enterprises which have invested in developing it will - not
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unreasonably - wish to recover their investment and a profit. Cash down 
purchases at resulting prices may well be beyond Southern capacity. Here 
the parameters of soft loans and regulated prices (a normal profit - while 
hard to define precisely - is one thing; a monopoly precise entrenched by 
international intellectual property right enforcement is something else) 
might well yield acceptable results.
The more serious problem is that of overall capital, operating and unit 
output costs.. If these do mean that Southern industrialisation would - in 
general - be non-competitive domestically and on export markets means 
toward an acceptable (to the global environment and to the South) way ahead 
are much harder to find. A GATT chapter dealing with allowable protection 
for environmental reasons might offer some mileage - the export side seems 
more intractable unless guide-lines for allowable capital subsidies plus 
some means of financing them can be discovered. What clearly is needed is 
more case by case work on how much environmentally friendly technologies 
would (or would not raise the costs of which products and the extent to 
which this would put the South (or rather which specific countries in the 
South) at a significant disadvantage. That research is an urgent priority 
- until more, more objective data is to hand serious negotiation - let 
alone action - will be delayed while fluorocarbon and net carbon dioxide 
emissions continue.
A parallel problem area is institutional. The Rio Conference was not a 
possible negotiating forum, even on principles let alone parameters and 
least of all specific agreements. The Montreal Convention (relating to 
ozone layer protection) is the product of a workable process using 
specialist and official input to lay the ground for a last compromise plus 
formal unveiling political session. If the commitment exists an analogous 
CO2 Convention could be envisaged (with emission control and absorption 
enhancement provisions).
However, if Southern states (especially the handful likely to have 
emissions seriously retarding ozone layer reduction or having a substantial 
impact on global warning) are to be added to the Montreal or included in 
the CO2 Convention, work needs to begin now on a viable approach to cost 
sharing. As speed is important this is unlikely to be via a single Special 
Fund (whether free standing or in the World Bank) nor through a system of 
emission permits based on population and transferable among countries
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(logically plus an analogous system to penalise reduction in vegetation and 
reward enhancement). Each would take too long to negotiate and the latter 
would lack a plausible enforcement agency even if the very real technical 
problems could be resolved speedily.
If the principle of cost sharing is agreed then a series of export studies 
leading to early official level explorations toward parameters on expected 
contributions and rough allocation of transfers (as done in IDA) would be 
possible. If that could be ratified at political level then how to, would 
- however messy, difficult and repeatedly threatened with breakdown - be 
feasible.
II.
Right To Development; Right To Survival
The right to development is not a codified or convention specified right so 
has no legal text. Nor have all contributions to dialogue on it been 
compatible, much less identical. However, several strands have become 
identifiable in the main body of discourse:
■ concern with the right to a decent livelihood for households and 
peoples as well as acceptable levels and growth paths of national and 
territorial output;
■ including participation, access and accountability (empowerment) 
aspects of the human condition as well as the more narrowly material;
■ provision of universal access to basic services (or basic social and 
human investments to use an alternative formulation) both from quality 
of life and quality of productivity/livelihood concerns;
■ highlighting empowerment as the main route out of absolute poverty but 
recognising the need for "safety nets" (as of right) to meet the needs 
of unempowerable persons or households;
■ acceptance that the right to development - like development, however 
defined can only be met over time measured in decades and, in any case, 
is an ongoing, processual right whose specific content will vary 
(develop) over time.
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Nothing in that set of strands is inconsistent with "The Right To Survival" 
(to cast environmental/ecology issues in rights terminology). Indeed, the 
recognition of development as processual and of attaining an acceptable 
approximation to it requiring decades implies a sustainability requirement. 
A right to development for one generation in terms condemning its posterity 
to the reverse would be something of a contradiction in terms, especially 
because most right to development advocates are concerned with human beings 
within social groups (in interaction with other people) rather than as 
isolated individuals and therefore are inherently multi-generationally 
oriented.
The right to survival is even less codified or the beneficiary of a process 
of dialogue than is the right to development. Discourse has tended to 
begin from ecological threats to survival and to emphasise (or at least 
demand) immediate technological answers with relatively less attention to 
process, codification or institutionalisation.
In a sense it has been analogous to fire fighting rather than to a socio- 
politically based campaign against poverty (or non-development). That 
approach has its uses - emergencies require immediate, approximately 
correct action with institutionalisation, participation, interaction with 
other concerns to be built in to hold the immediate gains after survival is 
assured. Whether it is an appropriate approach (beyond ringing a loud 
initial alarm) to most environmental problems is a matter of some dispute. 
Much environmental data is both scientific and subject to varying 
interpretations or questions as to accuracy. Even on global warming the 
time frame for action needed to stabilise (or for that matter the optimum 
temperature) is unclear. This relates in part to the offsetting impact of 
calamities (e.g. Mount Pinatubo) and catastrophes (e.g. Kuwait oil field 
fires) which apparently have provided up to five years more time 
(interestingly an excellent reason on ecological grounds for global finance 
for livelihood and land rehabilitation in the Philippines and eco-friendly 
technology transfer to Kuwait).
What is fairly clear is that an alarm ringing approach needs to be 
transformed into a more sober, bureaucratic, institutionalised one if it is 
to survive. One facet of this is clearly negotiations. Another may be 
building up a body of rights which even if not directly legally enforceable 
- especially globally - do have a value in the creation of a body of
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opinion and of expectations conducive to successful negotiation leading to 
implementation. In the case of "Right To Survival" components might 
include:
■ prevention of global emission levelB leading to ecological 
transformations which were substantially life or livelihood 
threatening;
■ similar provisions in respect to regional (e.g. acid rain) national 
(e.g. neo-desertification) and local (e.g. water pollution) ecological 
disintegration menaces;
■ effective access to technologies necessary or conducive to 
preventing/reversing environmental/ecological deterioration;
■ protection of species diversity with managed access and sharing of 
benefits resulting from that access:
■ shared responsibility for achieving results and for meeting costs on a 
basis related to prospective benefits and per capita resources as well 
as physical location of requisite action.
In principle - and in practice over a 50 years perspective - these strands 
are complementary to (in some cases essential for) those of the right to 
development. The areas of conflict are short term on the one hand and 
equitable divisions of costs/benefits on the other.
The household level short term conflicts turn on:
■ poverty
■ calamity
■ exclusion for ecological protection
These can be considered at household and national levels.
The first conflict is illustrated by many land and labour time poor rural 
households. To live now they must use land intensively in ways leading to 
erosion and/or loss of fertility, collect woodfuel in ways contributing to 
loss of tree/bush cover, curtail erosion avoidance and tree planting in 
order to devote time to immediate payoff activities. Sustainability to
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them necessarily begins with being alive today in order to have a tomorrow, 
even if today's actions erode tomorrow's probable livelihood and certainly 
that of present children as well as unborn descendants.
There is nothing very novel about the ways to transcend this context. 
Farming systems including more soil friendly crops (usually including 
trees), land reform, ability to pay for soil nutrients (natural and 
chemical), time savings to permit better land care, finance for soil 
protection works, alternative fuels and/or more efficient tree growing, 
etc. The case for priority to them is threefold:
■ poverty reduction/right to development
■ substantial macroeconomic gains (often, though not always, quite cost 
efficient ones on any criteria)
■ making ecological protection pay so that a group whom necessity forced 
to undermine their own livelihoods' sustainability are empowered to 
become their active defenders and promoters.
Calamity impact is illustrated by drought which aggravates the poverty 
position already noted and adds new problems:
■ concentration of populations (human and animal) leading to spot 
environmental degradation which often spreads cancerously;
■ failure to restore damage or to reduce future vulnerability before
resuming 'normal1 use.
Again the means to avert (indeed in some cases reverse) this downward 
dynamic are known. Early warning systems and timely provision of food ,(and 
water) near homes can avert population concentration. Pre-planned labour 
intensive works related to future vulnerability reduction/ecological 
protection brought into force promptly and continued to - say - 6 months 
after the first post-drought main harvest can combine survival assistance 
and enforced available labour time via work for food to improve (or at
least avoid worsening) of the underlying ecological position.
^ s^on as a result of measures intended to provide ecological protection 
has affected indigenous minority residents of wildlife protection areas, 
hill peasants and forest clearing cultivators. In a number of cases, the 
ecological gains have not been self-evident (e.g. hunter gatherers in 
African forest zone reserves) nor the motivation above doubt (e.g.
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Philippine approval of EEC backed plantation projects on steep slopes on 
which the indigenous Cordilleran peoples are forbidden to farm). However, 
in others there is little doubt either that existing poor household land 
use was ecological damaging or that the exclusion of those poor households 
was environmentally devastating for them.
Resolution of this conflict can proceed on two lines: enabling existing 
users to practice sustainable activities (discussed below in respect to 
Philippine ex-forest land) whether by altered make-up of activities or 
technique changes; and/or providing adequate, acceptable alternative 
livelihood access (usually involving land for rural households). The 
problems with the second approach (however appealing on paper) are that 
those excluded rarely have the leverage to ensure fair treatment; hunter- 
gatherer land requirements are exceedingly large and often require types of 
land which do not in fact exist; land tied cultures may be linked to 
particular pieces of land so that no substitution is socially adequate. 
Where practicable therefore, rendering livelihoods eco-friendly in the same 
location is preferable.
The same issues arise in rather different forms at national level. Poverty 
can force maximum resource exploitation to earn foreign exchange to cover 
import requirements or to service debt. Equally, it can be seen to require 
using low capital cost technology even if this also means low eco- 
friendliness.
As at household level, the governments are by no means unaware that the way 
in which non renewable resources are being used up, and the sustainability 
of nominally renewable ones endangered, does result in future costs. But, 
again like households, they perceive present survival and growth as 
overriding imperatives.
In respect to air, soil and water pollution, the perception of high future 
costs is real - the revelations from Central and Eastern Europe ensure 
that. However, their present ecological priority problems turn on local 
pollution - e.g. the smog banks over their cities and industrial areas - 
rather than the high level global issues (smog, in fact, offsets global 
warming albeit the net overall effect of carbon burning increases it except 
at suffocating combustion inefficiency levels). There is no inherent bias 
against modern eco-friendly technology (probably the reverse) but very
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serious doubts as to availability, price and impact on competitiveness, 
investible surplus and financeable growth rates.
As with households, the basic road to resolution turns on making present 
ecology protection attractive in present net cash flow terms. This can 
involve - compulsory transfer of technology (with or without managed 
prices), debt write-downs tied to ecological protection investment, joint 
finance packages for global (e.g. warming) and national (e.g. air cleaning) 
priorities. Assuming the transfers are both substantial and also less than 
programme costs (a safe assumption) both sides have an incentive to seek to 
reduce the costs of environmentally appropriate technology and to finance 
research to do so.
National calamity impact is almost directly analogous to household level. 
For example, Mount Pinatubo's explosion (ironically exceedingly valuable 
globally because of its contribution to middle and upper atmosphere dust) 
created human environmental needs as well as land reclamation ones. Had 
generous finance for these purposes (perhaps linked to seeking to develop 
small household agro forestry on derelict ex-forest lands) been made 
available, the pressure on the Philippines to make general cost "savings" 
(including a Bataan Nuclear settlement leading to activation of a poorly 
designed reactor near a fault line in an active volcanic zone) would have 
been lower.
The exclusion issue at global level is likely to prove explosive.
Unilateral imposition of nominally environmental protection based 
restrictions on trade will not be seen to be either fair or well 
intentioned. The sometimes questionable accuracy of the information on 
which they are based, the motives of some of their supporters and the 
apparent arbitrariness of their coverage (e.g. Japan, Spain and the USSR - 
in that order - are the states whose fishing practices are the most 
globally disastrous for fish stocks, but not the apparent lead targets for 
import restrictions) ensure the suspicion that their goal is protection and 
their targets the weak.
A combined incentive/disincentive approach including part coverage of 
technology change costs (nationally for richer states, on a broader basis 
for poorer) with an independent monitoring body might be both more widely 
acceptable and more productive. In particular, that approach would allow 
phasing in of improved practices where the result of instant changes would,
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in fact, be exclusion not adjustment and would also provide a basis for 
influencing techniques applied to domestic (as well as export) market 
oriented production.
Equitable division of costs and benefits is in principle easy to agree. A 
functional comprehensive costing and charging formula, however, is quite 
impossible to agree at political level. The question is what can be 
negotiated product by product, technique by technique, country by country. 
To assert that this is messy, tedious and at best approximately correct is 
to assert the self-evident, but there is no better option actually 
available now or even in the medium term.
At least six points are agreed to be relevant:
■ most (not all) present ecological damage at global level results from 
the historic activities of present rich counties at home and abroad
■ if present industrialising countries 'advance' to 1990 OECD output per 
capita levels using 1950-70 OECD technology, ecological collapse is 
inevitable
■ politically sustainable environmental agendas at national level must 
address domestic (e.g. air pollution, erosion) as well as global (e.g. 
fluorcarbon emission, deforestation) priorities
■ both external costs (from acid rain to ozone holes) and benefits (from 
additional carbon dioxide absorption to species diversity preservation) 
are common, complex and not readily quantifiable
■ early action in the right direction is needed both because of 
uncertainty as to how much is required and of the speed of impact
■ poor countries (and households) even if ultimately benefiting on direct 
discounted future gains flows calculations, may be unable to meet the 
initial capital costs.
That is an adequate base for potential recipients to put up reasoned 
project/programme proposals; for potential transferors to negotiate on 
content and transfer proportion and for a quasi independent expert group to 
put up proposals especially in respect to issues requiring global action 
with suggestions as to territorial distribution of action and national
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distribution of financing including transfer payments and receipts. From 
these - assuming adequate prioritisation of environmental protection and 
restoration in resource allocation - a workable process of negotiation, 
agreement, implementation and monitoring could result.
In principle the case for an independent evaluation, negotiating, resource 
transferring, monitoring agency is moderately convincing. The closest 
present parallel is IDA (with its country share on both payment and drawing 
side and its relatively strong role for relatively independent and 
technically competent staff).
Because of the present size and focus of IDA putting the environmental
project evaluation and finance in IDA (or the World Bank family) is
probably both impracticable and undesirable. Nothing in UNDP's record 
suggests it would be a suitable venue and, in any event, if it is to
coordinate UN economic activity it should not be one of the major
operational actors to be coordinated. The UN could upgrade its 
Environmental Programme to Specialised Agency status with an associated 
specialist programme negotiation agency (a la IFAD) but to do so and to run 
in the resultant machinery would - optimistically - take a decade. That is 
no reason for not considering starting that process now, but it is a 
compelling reason for making an operational start via coordinated bilateral 
bargaining immediately.
Population growth is not directly addressed in detail in this paper for 
three reasons:
■ output and technology issues - not population changes - are central in 
respect to the two most immediate global challenges - ozone layer 
holing and global warming
■ an approach literally targeting reduced population growth as an 
environmental protection instrument would raise serious normative 
problems and rather greater political ones as well as maximising North- 
South conflict
■ in respect to both the rural ecological and the poor household 
livelihood issues in the right to sustainable development cluster the 
causal direction is primarily from poverty to population growth and
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certain types of ecological damage - particularly to trees and shrubs, 
hillsides and land fertility more generally.
Therefore, right to livelihood implementation by and in support of poor 
rural households, including universal access to basic services, is the most 
important road to reduced ecological damage from enhanced household/land 
ratios (population growth). Certainly it needs complementary eco-friendly 
technique access as well as access to family planning programmes but 
without the right to development focus neither will usually prove 
particularly effective.
III.
Global Heritage and National Livelihood
The priority agenda for ecological sustainability/damage reduction globally 
does not always appear similar to that for ecological/environmental 
sustainability nationally. There may or may not be actual conflicts on the 
desirability of the items themselves, but different agendas with varying 
priority rankings and limited resources are a recipe for either conflict or 
inanition. This problem can be illustrated in four key areas:
■ threats to survival
■ threats to sustaining production
■ threats to global heritage
■ threats to amenity
The most prominent global threat to survival probably is the
thinning/holing of the ozone layer. For most poor countries it is an issue
of low domestic priority because their contribution to the problem (and 
therefore potential to help overcome it) is negligible. However, for some 
Southern economies it is a problem they see as relevant but only if the
Northern economies (which have caused over 95% of the damage to date) meet
the cost of the South's using new ozone friendly technologies. From their 
perspective, fluorocarbon bans without free (or at least highly subsidised) 
technology transfers are objectively (whether intentionally or not) a route 
to blocking their industrialisation. Talk of moving locally (but not 
globally) environmentally unfriendly industries to the South increases
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their suspicion that the fluorocarbon issue is being used deliberately to 
hamper their development.
In many African countries drought-erosion-desertification pose more 
immediate threats to survival of substantial numbers of their people and 
are, therefore, high on their ecology/environment priority agendas. In 
terms of resource transfers at least to reduce future drought 
vulnerability, finance for erosion control/agro forestry and anti­
desertification measures do not appear to feature prominently on Northern 
agendas nor were they highlighted at Rio. These countries are, 
understandably, suspicious about agendas on which Northern priorities are 
funded (or imposed without funding 1) while theirs are not treated seriously 
at global political and funding levels.
Threats to sustaining production at global level centres on global warming 
and its effect on rainfall patterns and sea levels. For a few Southern 
island countries this may well be a matter of national survival and for 
many others the rainfall shift results could be catastrophic. However, 
except for the island cases there is inadequate data to make the production 
threat fully credible or prioritisable. For many there is again little 
they can do. Namibia, for example, is bemused by suggestions its forestry 
priorities can be based on combating global warming. More trees and bushes 
it does (and many rural households do) want for reasons of fuel, fodder, 
building materials, food, cash income, soil protection and water 
conservation. But to suppose such a programme would be significant in 
global warming terms (and therefore should be designed specifically to 
relate to them) is facetious.
The main tropical forest producers' stance is more complex. They are well 
aware Northern countries have converted most forests into farms (or towns) 
as an integral part of their development and that few are even close to 
practising sustainable forestry. Several - e.g. Malaysia, Ghana - do have 
policies dividing future farm/town land from permanent forestry zones and 
attempting to achieve sustainable patterns of cutting/replanting on the 
latter. These may well be inadequate, but probably no more so than those 
of the USA and Canada. Further, so far as the greenhouse effect goes, 
cutting and replanting is as sound a solution as not cutting so that 
generalised opposition to harvesting a (potentially at least) renewable 
resource strikes a very sour note.
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Again the drought—desertification-erosion complex of issues usually has 
higher national priority in the South. This may be especially true in 
respect to cut out forest lands. These (even technically) cannot be 
restored to primary tropical forest status. Where - as in the Philippines 
- they are equal to total cultivated hectarage and ten times actual forest, 
how they are ecologically upgraded would appear crucial to soil 
preservation, livelihood and increasing carbon dioxide eating vegetation. 
Hopeless attempts to recreate forests - notably in the Philippines - lead 
to few trees, no secure tenure and the worst kind of erosive shifting 
cropping on steep slopes. Mixed agro-forestry could do much more to combat 
global warming as well as to protect soil and and could also provide a land 
reform route to complement the exceedingly politically difficult one of 
redistribution of existing cropped land and thereby benefit the environment 
of rural landless or illegally hill cropping poor households.
The carbon monoxide emitting - basically coal, oil and, in the South, wood 
burning - side of the global warming dialogue may be more a short versus 
long term issue than a North-South one. The lethal air of - e.g. Manila, 
Mexico City and Seoul is of concern to their governments and the last at 
least has spent considerable financial and policy resources (subsidised 
subways, high car and gasoline taxes) trying, rather unsuccessfully, to 
address it. But, even more than in respect to fluorocarbons, they perceive 
Northern industrialisation as having required a low cost polluting period 
with emission controls, smokeless zones, etc., part of the fruits of 
development to be consumed after industrialisation and high income levels 
had been achieved.
The Southern historical perception may well be irrelevant to the present. 
But unless it is addressed seriously by technological research and transfer 
prioritisation or - less probably - by carbon dioxide emission quotas based 
on population and saleable among countries - continued deadlock is likely.
Threats to heritage on the global agenda focuses on species diversity both 
as to flora (e.g. tropical rainforests, fragile desert ecological zones) 
and fauna. The cases put are overlapping: a) diverse species include ones 
which may be valuable; b) something is lost socially and aesthetically when 
species or settings cease to exist; c) extinction of species is a moral 
abuse of nature/creation.
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None of these points raises particular inherent problems of perspective 
divergence between North and South albeit the particular lists may vary and 
the form reverence for nature takes relative to use varies significantly 
(e.g. a hunter-gatherer for survival reasons wishes to preserve species 
diversity but also sees clearing areas wildlife reserves of one species - 
homo sapiens - to do so as a denial of his heritage of using them).
The divergences turn on how much territory needs to be devoted to species 
preservation, to what other uses - if any - it can be put, how to resolve 
conflicts (e.g. between crocodiles, children and washerwomen in rivers 
passing through populated areas) and who is to pay for preserving the 
global heritage of humanity on what basis.
Species diversity preservation in a context of relationships either 
unaltered by human presence or with uses limited to research, low intensity 
viewing and - perhaps - traditional hunting and gathering does limit land 
use. If land is scarce and heritage areas do occupy high quality land 
(either may or may not be so depending on the context) trade-offs arise. A 
selective logging/replanting long rotation can preserve a tropical forest 
as a sustainable source of livelihood and of biomass and also as a consumer 
of carbon dioxide protecting against the greenhouse effect. "Untouched 
wilderness" is not needed for that purpose, but is necessary to preserve 
species and species interaction diversity. Muddling the two does create 
tensions - to propose 5 to 10% of forests be preserved as "wilderness", 50% 
converted to controlled, sustainably renewed harvesting patterns, 20% put 
into agro forestry and 20% to field cropping and non-agricultural uses may 
often be an acceptable basis for planning, whereas an implication that all 
should be kept untouched leads to an explosive reaction to a threat to the 
livelihood heritage sustainability of both farmers and forestry workers (as
well as of national exports to reduce external dependence).
The question of balancing uses is a complex one which needs to be faced 
technically and pragmatically not emotionally and a l'outrance. This may 
be even more true in respect to fauna as illustrated by crocodiles.
Crocodiles are an endangered species, but to Africans living in areas with
substantial crocodile populations their children appear to be the 
endangered species and crocodiles the aggressor. The bottom line is that 
crocodiles and human beings cannot coexist on the same land or, more 
important, in the same water. There it; a perfectly practicable way
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forwards a.) provide wildlife sanctuaries large enough for wild animals to 
live naturally, b.) together with managed environments with intensive 
commercial viewing potential (e.g. Namibian tourist game ranches) and
c.) crocodile farms to meet the demand for skins which is inherently not 
different from that for other kinds of leather if it does not threaten 
species survival, d.) while protecting rural households from interference 
by crocodiles with their livelihood and human environment which in effect 
means making those areas crocodile free.
Extreme cases are the anopheles mosquito and the tse tse fly - the carriers 
of malaria and of both animal and human sleeping sickness respectively. 
Despite some rumours to the contrary, neither is - unfortunately - an 
endangered species. In Sub-Saharan Africa malaria kills about three 
million children a year and animal sleeping sickness endangers at least a 
million household livelihoods as well as keeping millions of hectares under 
quite unlovely scrub bush. Unless the human species is the only one of no 
concern (an odd viewpoint for people) or human environment is inherently 
less important than natural ecology, defence of the right to survive of the 
anopheles (or egyptensis) mosquito and the tse tse fly outside controlled 
laboratory environments in climates fatal to them if they escape is hard to 
justify. Certainly attempts (which have happened notably in respect to the 
tse tse fly as a 'protector of open space and game') to do so are met with 
a combination of incomprehension and fury by Africans which does damage to 
the prospects for dialogue on areas - e.g. crocodiles - in which mutually 
acceptable solutions are fairly clearly feasible.
The cost argument is quite simple. If species diversity is a common human 
heritage, the costs of preserving it are a common human obligation. It is 
usually argued that most key areas are in the South (presumably because 
most in the North have already been destroyed). But the South is also 
poorer so that both on cost per person and cost as a proportion of national 
income tests it would bear a higher share of the cost than the North if no 
resource transfers were made. Thus on even proportional, much less 
progressive, taxation principles it has a case for being paid a proportion 
of the costs of heritage preservation.
The case is strengthened by the fact that the main medium term 
beneficiaries of species and ecology diversity preservation will be 
Northern viewers, researchers and enterprises and that the basic threats to
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some species are market threats driven by Northern demand even if the 
actual physical damage is done in the South by Southerners. This is a 
contentious area in two different ways.
The Northern position is strongly against the South hampering research 
including creating barriers to sending specimens abroad for research, 
reproduction and genetic engineering either by access limitations or by 
high fees. That stance is oddly at variance with the growing body of 
intellectual property law which creates monopoly rights in the products of 
such research including their sale back to the country from which the key 
species came. Free access for us, monopoly prices to you is not self- 
evidently a normatively sound principle and certainly not one the South can 
be expected to welcome. Whether substantial support for on site or in 
region research combined with obligatory royalty payments if species were 
commercialised or used as an input into genetic engineering would be a way 
forward is unclear but at least worth exploration.
The Northern stance in respect to exhibition of rare species (whether 
orchids or skins or shells) in destructive ways for Northern markets is 
rather different. The South is expected to halt the trade - often by no 
means easy or cost free - while the North is not seen to be at least 
equally obligated to take action against importers/purchasers. (This may 
be a misperception, but the laxity or at least porosity of Northern 
controls often justified by technical and cost considerations makes it 
relatively convincing.) No obligation is accepted to provide resources for 
enforcement let alone for targeted livelihood enhancement to dry up the 
pool of poor households providing the field level poachers, plant uprooters 
and reef blasters/shell collectors. Some grace and favour payments are 
made, but on a relatively small scale and with no acceptance of a mutual 
obligation principle.
ThreatB to amenity are not usually stated openly at global or national 
level but are cloaked in more appealing "heritage preservation" garb. They 
are nonetheless real and create Southern (and poor Northern) suspicions as 
to the true motivations and concerns of conservationists. They certainly 
played a major role in the origins of the conservationist movement, e.g. 
the Sierra Club. At that stage they were elitist — preserving pristine 
nature for the affluent who could afford to enjoy it.
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In the South there is a suspicion that much conservationism is still about 
preserving playgrounds in the poor South for the rich North. This is not 
necessarily resented as such - most Southern countries and many Southern 
workers do perceive tourism (Northern playground provision) as a desirable 
'on-shore export'. The resentment is not so much about tourism - even 
limited access millionaire tourism can be very lucrative - but to a sensed 
hypocrisy in arguments for nature which are actually for tourist amenity 
preservation.
Southern threat to amenity priorities do exist. Among them low cost access 
to natural parks and preservation of urban open spaces (parks and low 
density commercial/governmental areas with trees) rank high in several 
African countries. The main users of the second and potential 
beneficiaries of the first would be low to lower middle income Africans. 
These items, which have an ecological as well as a human environmental 
base, are not now on the global agenda. Worse, the main threats to centre 
city open spaces in, for example, two East African capitals have come from 
embassy as well as foreign press empire and hotel chain efforts to secure 
parts of them as development sites.
This quick overview suggests not so much that global and South national 
agendas are diametrically opposed as that inadequate attention is being 
paid to:
a. separating sustainability (e.g. anti-global warming) and preservation 
(e.g. species diversity) goals because of their very different 
implications for acceptable uses;
b. seeking to facilitate transfer of state of the art environmentally 
friendly technology to the South at costs which do not grossly impede 
production and livelihood development;
c. recognition that human livelihood concerns (e.g. land to grow food) are 
valid and cannot be swept aside by ecological idealism (or
reductionism);
d. acceptance that national environmental priorities and action toward 
them are just as important — and of greater medium term impact on most 
people — as global agendas and that failure to address the South's
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agendas seriously is a barrier to mobilising South support for global 
issues;
e. realisation that contexts matter — the human environments of countries 
as well as their ecological patterns vary enormously;
f. serious examination of acceptable cost and benefit sharing mechanisms;
g. looking squarely at the fact that on the face of it the South is now 
being asked to act to save the world — including the North - from the 
consequences of past Northern eco—vandalism while basically Northern 
market forces are allowed (or even encouraged) to erode Southern 
environmental protection efforts.
IV.
Transforming Conservation into Sustainable Development
Conservation and preservation carry overtones of freezing (or reversing) 
uses. Sustainable development implies the acceptance (or requirement) of 
use changes so long as they do not lead to irreversible ecological or human 
environmental degradation. In some cases sustainability does require 
preservation - e.g. wilderness areas to protect bio-diversity. In others -
e.g. harvesting fish or trees in a context allowing or providing for 
regeneration sustainability is compatible with enhanced use. Therefore, 
sustainable development would appear both the more general goal and the one 
to which the broadest coalitions of supporters can be rallied. If this is 
to be achieved, several issues have to be tackled on a case by case, 
contextual basis. Each is contentious but usually in terms of trade-offs 
and compromises which allow for reasoned dialogue, agreed compromise and 
sustainable progress which posing narrow either or positions and engaging 
in a diatribe of the deaf do not.
The first main question is how much of what kind of change is acceptable 
where and under which conditions. In respect of some fragile environments 
virtually none. In other cases - e.g. - use of fluorocarbons - change is 
needed precisely because present use levels are incompatible with 
environmental sustainability. But in other cases more intensive and 
different use is sustainable and seeking to block it environmentally (and
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probably more narrowly ecologically) damaging. The case of cut over former 
forest land in the Philippines has already been cited. Another is Ghanaian 
tropical forests.
These fall into two groups - national protected forests and "stool" (local 
governmental) forests. The latter cannot be protected because past 
political history's record of reactions to efforts to remove them from 
chiefly control means no conceivable Ghanaian government will attempt to 
prevent their use or to subject them to compulsory acquisition. In fact, 
most of them are largely cut over and/or are being nibbled by farmers 
opening up homesteads to produce needed rural livelihoods and food. 
Attention to agro forestry and field cropping techniques with relatively 
high carbon dioxide absorbing and soil preserving characteristics is 
possible, keeping the land under forests is not.
The national forests can be protected and their protection - consistent 
with sustained or enhanced timber yield - is a governmental priority. The 
broad parameters are 25 year usehold leases with 5 selective cuts at five 
year intervals and requirements as to felling, transporting and replanting. 
From a commercial and carbon dioxide absorption perspective this could 
upgrade the forests. Combined with incentives to export wood products 
(lumber and veneer through furniture parts) it could make conservation and 
export expansion march hand in hand.
The key barrier to achieving that end is finance: for research, for enough 
well trained forestry personnel, for high enough pay to foresters to give 
some protection against bribery, for vehicles and fuel to provide foresters 
with mobility to inspect and enforce contractual regulations. Until 
Ghana's economy is stronger, it needs continued assistance (building on 
past- WFP and World Bank support) to articulate, implement, enforce what 
basically is a sustainable development strategy consistent with the global 
warming agenda point. Shotgun criticism based on near total lack of 
knowledge either of the "stool"/state land division or of the existing 
forest protection/development strategy is in no way helpful to Ghana or to 
the global agenda.
Species protection/bio—diversity is a goal which cannot be met within the 
present strategy. But in fact Ghana has quite limited forest areas of 
serious interest from this perspective. If two or three areas of - say - 
10,000 ha each were identified, it is by no means clear Ghana would object
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to their being closed to all uses other than research and low density, low 
impact visits. In the context of significant support for sustainable 
harvest enhancement in other forested areas, such agreement would in fact 
be highly negotiable.
The Ghana case raises the basic question: Who pays? When? How? In 
principle — and in the long term — Ghanaian forest users can be expected to 
meet the costs of contractual obligations (including replanting and the 
Ghana government (out of tax revenue from incomes and profits generated 
from forest use in general and contract fees in particular) to meet the 
forestry service research, personnel, monitoring and enforcement bills.
In the short term, there may be a need to phase in higher contractual 
obligations by giving interim royalty/concession fee rebates. There 
certainly is a need to augment Ghana government resources. So long as the 
basic human and social investment/basic service budgets for water, health, 
education are palpably inadequate (by the World Bank's guide-lines as well 
as in terms of Ghanaian aspirations) radical increases to the forestry 
budget will be normatively problematic and politically untenable 
(especially with governance accountable to an electorate clamouring for the 
services) unless they carry with them substantial external "matching 
funds".
Ghana forestry is not atypical of many environmental protection cases. 
However, other categories arise. The first is that in which the need for 
protection enforcement - e.g. against poachers - is largely generated by 
Northern demand. (Largely not wholly - ivory and, especially, rhinoceros 
horn demand has a substantial Southern component, but not in the countries 
where there are elephants or rhinoceri to protect.) Here either the North 
should crack down on the demand end and/or finance much of the supply choke 
off. The issues are - on a lower key - remarkably similar to those 
surrounding the drug trade (cocaine, heroin, opium that is - not 
pharmaceuticals). The second is that in which Southern protection and 
access to Northern users can be expected to generate Northern production 
and profits - e.g. Southern species fed into Northern plant breeding and 
genetic engineering. In this case a claim for more than full cost is 
reasonable on pure market as well as normative principles.
The final distinguishable category is technology transfer to make non- 
ecologically/environmentally damaging urban and industrial development in
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the South both practicable and coat efficient. Here the bottom line is not 
so much normative as practicable - if Southern industrialising countries 
are to halt/reverse use of fluorocarbons and release of combustion 
pollutants then they will in fact need technological access at low cost to 
ways and means of doing so without seriously impeding production growth or 
rendering it significantly higher cost.
The Southern case for substantial payments has not been helped by attempts 
to use the environment as a beast of burden on which to load all transfer 
payment needs, hopes and desires - as exemplified in the South Commission's 
environmental paper. A systematic examination of types of transfers and of 
individual cases would seem likely to be more fruitful _if the richer third 
of the world is willing to pay a share of global/national environmental 
priority agenda cost equivalent to its share of global income (and arguably 
global benefits from implementation). If it is not willing then the global 
agenda will simply not be achieved whatever the rhetoric on any side.
Idealistic (even if rational) global tax or transferable pollution right 
certificate schemes are not - at least in the short run - helpful to 
securing resource transfers. Even were such supra-national taxes and 
licenses generally agreed in principle and the "free rider" problem 
evidently soluble (neither of which is the case) dialogue on details and 
getting a system up and running would take the best part of a decade. Ad 
hoc agreement on payment guide-lines at a global forum, a rough sharing 
agreement (e.g. under OECD auspices for the North) and case by case/country 
by country quasi contractual agreements would be much more likely to 
produce significant results between now and 2000.
Fairly clearly not all aspects of sustainable development can in practice 
be financed under a globally agreed environmental rubric. Poverty 
reduction and absolute poverty elimination are environmental goals.
However, to seek to put them en bloc into the global environmental transfer 
payment system will not work, whether it should or not.
However, there is an area in which linkage - at least at the level of joint 
consideration - would be desirable and perhaps feasible. That is support 
for victims of natural calamities and man-made catastrophes. This is 
currently financed as humanitarian (human environment) survival relief. It 
is inadequately conceptualised and operated in respect to early warning 
based damage reduction (e.g. enabling drought victims to stay in home areas
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by timely provision of food and water at rural distribution points) and to 
rehabilitation and future vulnerability reduction. While the basic case 
for a broader approach is a general poor persons' livelihood rehabilitation 
and human environmental one there are distinct minimisation of ecological 
damage (soil, pasture over-use; local deforestation and erosion; neo- 
desertification) aspects.
Who benefits? may appear to be a question with the evident answer —
"almost everyone". But if when, how and when? are appended to it, the 
questions' answers become much less self-evident especially, but not only, 
in the South. For two reasons more attention should be given to 
articulating specific contextual answers.
The first, is that proportions of benefits are at least one component in 
agreement on cost sharing.
The second, is that saleability of environmental measures which entail 
costs requires demonstrating benefits which are immediate and concrete 
enough to convince those who can (and usually will) otherwise block the 
implementation of the environmental agenda. Unless poor people in the 
South aB well as less poor in the North see the net effects of proposed 
changes as positive they are likely to block them and certain not to be 
enthusiastic, self-driven implementerB. This is not a matter of less 
concern about ecology and sustainability but of concern about livelihood 
losses (at the extreme survival prospects) in the absence of clearly 
understood, tangible countervailing gains.
V.
Conflicting Contexts and Perspectives; Ivory
Ivory illustrates how different contexts and perspectives may lead to head- 
on clashes even among governments and bodies all committed to conservation. 
Ivory is now a CITES — Annex 1 listed product banned from international 
trade together with items carved from it. Both the ban and its 
continuation have divided African countries — by no means along pro— and 
anti— conservation lines. The division can be illustrated by Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe.
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T — za-n:La fav°ured adoption and supports continuation of the ban. It has 
attempted - with game warden equipment and fire power inferior to that of 
poachers - to protect elephant and rhinoceros with limited success.
Because much poaching and exporting is trans-border, it sees little success 
through unilateral action and doubts poaching can be stopped or radically 
decreased unless the post ban collapse of world market ivory prices can be 
sustained by a continued ban.
Tanzania does view elephants (and other game) as economic assets as well as 
part of its heritage:
a. a key element in tourism
b. part of the attraction of photographic and (limited) hunting safaris.
This perception is held by the residents of many areas near game reserves 
as well as by the government. It leads - under present circumstances - to:
a. seeking external assistance from the larger, richer portion of the 
global community to help protect the Tanzanian wildlife portion of the 
global heritage;
b. acceptance of the loss of revenue from "dead" (tusks collected from 
elephants who died of natural causes) ivory sales by the government 
because a legal ivory market provides a cover for illegal transactions.
Zimbabwe was a vehement opponent of a blanket ban and is committed to its 
amendment to permit trade in ivory from countries with adequate 
conservation policies and results. Except for the probable reaction of 
Northern states on issues not related to ivory, it would have begun 
exporting again unilaterally.
Zimbabwe sees itself as penalised, despite effective conservation, for the 
weaknesses (and blind eyes) of others and as asked to bear costs to benefit 
others with no compensation. This has not greatly weakened its commitment 
to conservation in Zimbabwe, but it has aroused grave suspicion that 
Northern ecological initiatives in general are either a new form of 
hegemonic interference or, at best, an initiative to achieve global ends 
with benefits skewed to the North and costs to the South.
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Zimbabwe's game wardens have been effective in protecting the elephant - 
albeit not the less numerous and more valuable to poachers - rhinoceros. 
Given their pattern of shooting to kill suspected poachers on sight, one 
may well raise human rights questions about their tactics, but it is a fact 
that heavily armed poachers are dangerous to well armed wardens backed by 
helicopters like Zimbabwe's and often lethal to less well equipped weaker 
ones like Tanzania's. The service is now weakening, partly because of 
general fiscal stringency but partly — at least in Zimbabwe's opinion - 
because the CITES1 ban has starved it of revenue.
The revenue from "dead" ivory and that from culling to avert excess herd 
build-up damaging to reserves (and of rogues damaging cropped areas) was a 
significant source of funding for the game protection service and natural 
parks more generally. It has vanished since the ban (which Zimbabwe has 
observed while stockpiling tusks).
The spread effect of this is to weaken various initiatives to educate and 
share economic benefits of wildlife with villages. While Zimbabwe 
acknowledges the key revenue flow is from tourism, it sees no reason that 
the ivory and products (leather, artifacts) derived from natural deaths and 
culling should not be built up as a supporting flow for conservation 
spending, village welfare and craft livelihoods.
Zimbabwe's proposals that ivory and ivory products from countries with 
sound protection and viable herds be licensed clearly does pose problems of 
policing. Most observers (including several African countries) see them as 
insuperable. While Zimbabwe disagrees, it probably would be less vehement 
had it been offered ecological agency or bilateral aid grants either 
equivalent to or a substantial proportion of the income lost as a result of 
the CITES ban.
The initial core opposition to the ban was led by South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Botswana - all with viable, protected herds, probably requiring annual 
culling. The support of Namibia and Mozambique (where war and the cover it 
provided for poaching has created survival crises for elephants) related 
more ® feeling of obligation to Zimbabwe and Botswana than to their 
domestic positions and neither has been prominent in calling for renewed 
exports. Malawi's position is somewhat different (and more opaque) as it 
has ineffective, non-prioritised protection and dwindling herds and no 
particular sense of solidarity with Zimbabwe.
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VI.
Conflicting Contexts and Perspectives; Indigenous Minorities
No issue is more controversial than that of the land rights of indigenous 
minority peoples. On two points there is little doubt. First, most 
indigenous minorities have (in most cases) suffered massive loss of land 
and therefore of livelihood and ability to sustain their social and 
cultural systems both under colonial rule and subsequently under national 
majority (or majority member non-democratic) rule. Second, the culture and 
social relations of most indigenous minorities are tied to certain specific 
sites and land areas, loss of which has had devastating social and cultural 
as well as economic impact on their members.
Beyond that there is limited agreement. Because land has cultural and 
sacral meaning, because most indigenous minority systems are land extensive 
(at the extreme hunting and gathering) and because the numbers of group 
member or trusted external specialists understanding and able to negotiate 
effectively with the majority system are usually very small (to nil), 
indigenous minority groups tend to make what appear to majorities to be 
unreasonable, maximalist demands and to be slow to grasp opportunities for 
negotiation.
There is a similar discontinuity between a relatively to totally romantic 
viBion (owing more to La Nouvelle Heloise than to reality) and an almost 
equally overblown Hobbesian one of short and unpleasant lives. (Neither is 
shared by most members of most indigenous minorities.) The ecological and 
livelihood balance of most indigenous minority cultures cannot cope with 
primary health care (which most want) without additional land or altered 
(often radically altered) livelihood technology. With few exceptions 
formal education disintegrates such societies by taking their most 
energetic youths from them but the alternative of near isolation in what 
look suspiciously like "human game reserves" is little more appealing. Per 
contra indigenous minorities are not "naturally" anomic, shiftless, 
indigent, drunkards - those characteristics result from the theft of land, 
livelihood and dignity. Culturally these peoples are neither simple nor 
unsophisticated, but their technological limitations and the rigidity of 
their cultures renders many so fragile - as societies and as individuals -
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as to make almost any form of interaction with other cultures dangerous and 
problematic.
The term "indigenous minority" is a somewhat artificial construct whose 
objective correlative varies contextually. It clearly is not perceived as 
including all the people in — e.g. — Kenya or Nigeria or Tanzania where 
none has a majority nor to relate to strong, but minority, peoples such as 
the Ndebele in Zimbabwe. In much of the Sahel it includes nomadic 
pastoralists, but in Tanzania and Kenya the Masai people are perceived 
either as not a national minority or as a borderline case because they have 
been able to hold much of "their" land (indeed to acquire new in Southern 
Tanzania), to adapt their livelihoods and to acquire a respectable degree 
of political leverage. Subjectively the definition does include 
substantial powerlessness and extreme difficulty in technical and cultural 
adaptation without livelihood and economic collapse.
The complexity of the human rights and environment issues involved can be 
illustrated by relations between the Botswana Government and the Basarwa 
people (previously derogatorily called Bushmen). The historic 
Tswana/Basarwa relations were of dominance and dependence but not of 
slavery or denial of common humanity - many Tswana (including elite 
members) have acknowledged Basarwa ancestors. The practice of holding 
Basarwa households as near slaves was not a Tswana custom but is more 
associated with the Immigrant Herero (the Herero emigrants from Namibia 
after the German war of annihilation) and some of the immigrant European 
Limpopo Valley farmers.
The independent Botswana government is well intentioned, relatively 
paternalistic and baffled in its relations with the Basarwa as communities 
or as peoples (as opposed to defending their individual rights). Most are 
either no longer primarily hunter-gatherers or find that livelihood is 
increasingly precarious in the face of increasing population and needs on 
the one hand and constant or shrinking land availability on the other.
Indeed a majority are basically underpaid workers with Tswana, Karanga or 
Herero cattle herds or on European (or Botswanan of European ancestry) 
farms and their attempts to hold their cultural and social relations 
together are, at best, eroding. Another minority are relatively 
unsuccessful pastoralists occasionally with some crop growing.
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Initially the government supposed making provision of health, education, 
water and calamity (drought) relief universal would solve poor Basarwa's 
basic problems as much as those of other poor rural residents. It has come 
to realise this is not the case. However, how to address livelihood and 
community issues baffles it. To recreate a hunting-gathering base would 
require massive transfer of pastoral land to hunting country - possible 
good for game but, by concentrating cattle on a smaller area, hardly for 
overall ecological sustainability. Politically that is unfeasible and 
normatively it does pose a conundrum: do the Basarwa have a right to
insist on a way of life requiring at least ten times the hectarage per 
household of the pastoral way of life of the plurality of rural Batswana 
households?
If Basarwa communities are to be given a viable future - and health care to 
go beyond "grab and jab" to real interaction - then there has to be an 
economic base other than hunting-gathering and/or near total dependence on 
quasi migrant, low wage labour for most Basarwa households. The evident 
candidate is pastoralism - partly for ecological reasons, partly because it 
appears least far from Basarwa tradition. However, remaining hunting- 
gathering land is marginal to sub-marginal for cattle (it may be less 
unsuited to karakul sheep or game ranching) and the Basarwa link to herding 
is as dependent, grossly exploited labour. To date efforts at building up 
Basarwa villages with pastoral livelihood bases have mixed and problematic 
results - positive enough not to abandon the effort, but limited enough to 
raise doubts how many of necessary and possible answers have been found.
The problem is exacerbated by the real difficulty in communication between 
two very different perceptions of life by Basarwa communities and by the 
relatively rational, bureaucratic (in the Weberian not the perjorative 
sense), technologically optimistic view of Botswana's energetic and 
relatively efficient civil service. It is easy to fault the Government for 
paternalism. However, the questions of how to relate to and how to enable 
Basarwa to make possible choices (a return to 1750 hunting-gathering plus 
modern primary health services and rural water points is not one of them) 
are not subject to obvious or easy answers. But both right to development 
and right to decent human environment concerns require continued - and more 
successful - efforts.
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Ecology, Economics and Structural Adjustment
Two developments in respect to ecology campaign foci over the past decade 
and especially the past five years are greater stress on economic 
considerations and especially market based "polluter pays" type 
articulations of goals and seeking to tie ecological soundness promotion to 
World Bank lending, in particular structural adjustment. Both of these 
approaches have some (guite possibly overestimated) potential, but both 
also have problematic elements.
As already stressed, environmental concerns are not wholly ecological and 
have community, national and regional agendas whose long term basic 
complementarity should not be allowed to obscure significant short run 
tensions and trade-offs. In that setting iterative formulations at all 
three levels with a process of dialogue and trade-off to achieve 
consistency is probably the least unsatisfactory basic operating technique. 
Economics can - to a degree - illuminate present and future cost/benefits 
of trade-offs but it is not particularly helpful at creating or sustaining 
(as opposed to providing part of the content for) the bargaining process.
Further, macro economics and micro natural science are uneasy partners.
The first deals in broad principles and monetary aggregates from which 
particular micro impacts are deduced. The latter starts with contextual 
physical data and processes and builds up propositions about more general 
outcomes. At present neither has a particularly impressive track record on 
predicting (or dating) environmental outcomes especially in cases lacking a 
substantial body of historical data and context specific analysis.
Careful application of macro economic principles to specific environmental 
questions usually gives the answer "it all depends". This is not a useless 
answer, if it also specifies what it depends on because that is useful for 
picking out ways of studying the specific case. However, it does mean 
hopes for quick read out answers without detailed case by case study are 
overblown.
For example, higher interest rates shift the balance of economic advantage 
to low capital cost/low construction time approaches. In the case of power 
it reduces the attractiveness both of nuclear and of hydroelectric power -
VII.
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presumptively with opposite ecological implications. (Among non- 
conventional sources it reduces the attractiveness of tidal, wave and - 
probably - solar power but may favour windmills.) The probable chief 
gainer is natural gas fired generation (especially if the gas is an already 
available and currently unused by-product of oil extraction). The short 
term ecological implications of more gas (and less coal or oil) fired 
thermal power are ecologically sound but, a.) gas is a finite, non­
renewable resource and b.) in the longer term it may be ecologically as 
well as economically more prudent to reserve it (apart from otherwise 
flared associated gas from petroleum fields) for chemical (e.g. fertiliser) 
production.
To take another example, lower subsidies on inputs will reduce their usage. 
In the case of chemical fertilisers, the environmental implications almost 
certainly diverge sharply between high fertiliser intensity farming in crop 
surplus areas (e.g Western Europe, North America) and very low fertiliser 
intensity farming in food (and rural livelihood) scarce areas (e.g. African 
household sector agriculture). In the latter case, fertiliser related soil 
and water pollution is low and the practicability of sustainable intensive, 
permanent cultivation without higher than present chemical replacements is 
low. But at present and even more at 2010 household/land ratios that shift 
from long rotation/low input cultivation is a human environmental 
necessity. Less fertiliser is likely to mean more soil degradation.
Natural science approaches have rather different limitations. Much 
available data is so context specific that its applicability is not 
general. To put it differently, counter intuitive outcomes are not 
infrequent. For example, to concentrate livestock at any one time on a 
small proportion of grazing land would seem intuitively to be a recipe for 
pasture degradation, soil erosion and - perhaps - water table sinking. In 
fact under a controlled, small paddock, frequent rotation system in several 
parts of semi-arid Southern Africa precisely the reverse results: carrying 
capacity is increased, secular pasture improvement set in motion, erosion 
controlled and - less uniformly - water table recovery enhanced. There are 
perfectly standard scientific reasons for this counter-intuitive result, 
but they require study of the specific ecology and ecological dynamics of 
the case, not generalisation from different micro ecological settings.
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Designing market mechanisms to articulate/implement policy goals is often 
likely both to be more effective and lower cost than using administrative 
devices. Assuming agreed levels of sulphur emission from power stations 
can be agreed, issuing transferable emission allowance certificates 
together with imposing draconic penalties for over-emission may be the 
optimal available implementation route in Northern industrial economies.
(It is one for which a standard neo-classical micro, and perhaps macro, 
economic case can be constructed.) The danger lies in assuming all issues 
can be dealt with in this way. Some - e.g. catastrophic risk (Bhopal and 
Chernobyl) — cannot. For others - e.g. individual vehicle emission levels 
- pass or fail road-worthiness tests are likely to be more functional than 
graduated licence fees. Markets are means not magicians.
The World Bank's role in environmental protection has begun to develop a 
life of its own. Having built up an environmental cadre and put 
environmental audits into many project evaluations it has provided itself 
with a built-in environmental lobby. However, initially the Bank began to 
pay attention to ecological and human environmental (largely indigenous 
minority rights) issues because Northern and - less frequently but vide the 
Philippines and India - Southern NGOs saw it as an accessible target whose 
funding of major projects gave it substantial environmental leverage which 
it was either neglecting or using in damaging ways.
That was, and is, a remarkable triumph for the environmentalists. Except 
for a handful of country cases in which major funders used all of their 
leverage, the Bank has otherwise been very much a self-accountable band of 
Platonic Guardians (not always in agreement with each other) very 
successfully resistant to outside pressure. But it is a problematic 
achievement if nationally grounded environmental priorities accountable to 
national majorities with human rights safeguards for individuals and 
indigenous minorities are the goals. External NGOs are even less 
accountable to Southern people than Southern governments. The World Bank 
while recognising that only "nationally owned" programmes (in any field) 
are sustainable finds it remarkably hard to cooperate in their construction 
rather than seeking to ventriloquise them. Massive, intrusive 
conditionality imposed by rich funding bodies (as most NGOs are quick to 
recognise in other contexts) is not a way to mobilise broad, internalised 
Southern support, sustained strategic articulation or whole-hearted 
implementation. A more balanced approach of advice, technological transfer
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(to increase design and implementation capacity), refusal to fund the 
environmentally unsound and - perhaps - a special IDA window (additional to 
normal country 'quotas' or 'ceilings' which do in fact exist even if with 
considerable upward and near total downward flexibility) for financing 
projects directly related to environmental sustainability, vulnerability 
reduction and rehabilitation might generate more securely based progress, 
less suspicion and lower risks of serious conflict.
"Structural Adjustment and Environment" is a linking arising (particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa) from the ubiquitous nature of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and their visible (or to hard line critics naked) impact on 
policy, practice and external resource flows. For the World Bank it is an 
entry point to exert leverage (and to placate its ecological critics?).
For environmentalists it is a bandwagon to climb on to gain attention. For 
African negotiators it is an irritating complication that cannot be ignored 
but must be taken seriously.
Analytically the linkage is either fairly marginal or unsound. As noted, 
macro economic analysis (the core of structural adjustment design) can 
provide a partial agenda of detailed questions but not read out answers.
It assuredly has little power to identify what new programmes should be 
undertaken based on national ecological and environmental priorities. It 
can - once such an agenda is constructed from the micro up - help evaluate 
economic ways, means, costs and benefits but that is very different from 
initiating design.
Second, conditionality in Structural Adjustment implies cutoffs of funding 
well beyond rejecting a particular unsound project. Do environmentalists 
seriously wish to halt Ghana's economic recovery through massive withdrawal 
of external transfers to force changes in a forestry policy they do not 
appear to understand and which is arguably sound in principle but grossly 
underfunded? If so, the term "ecolonialism" is rather more than a 
rhetorical epithet - colonialism almost always constructs glosses to 
explain why it 'really' is in the best interests of the colonised.
Actual ecological/environmental content in particular national Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (as opposed to large, freestanding projects) is both 
mixed and — at least in the vast majority of cases — peripheral. Arguably 
anti-poverty/Social Dimensions of Adjustment in some SAPs is an exception.
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However, it is treated purely on a human environmental level and not 
related to ecology in any systematic way.
Initially SAPs had no overt ecological content. Even now the number of 
environmental conditions in Policy Framework Papers (which can run to 50 
pages and 150 conditions) is minute, mostly relating to sustainable forest 
use. There are environmental glosses on (deductive analyses of) some 
country programmes, but these appear to be very much parallel papers after, 
and with minor influence on, strategic formulation. The number of serious 
ground up SAP environmental assessment (ex ante) or audit (ex post) studies 
in SSA still seems to be stuck at zero. In fairness, countries are not 
exactly pressing for more PFP pages or conditions - except in some cases 
(e.g. Mozambique) on the poverty front. But some (e.g. Tanzania) have done 
some environmental assessments and strategy exploration of their own and 
would - if additional funding for articulation and implementation had been 
clearly on offer - have been willing to discuss specific SAP-Environmental 
links.
This is not to say SAPs and PFPs do not have environmental/ecological 
consequences but that they are not consequences resulting from any overall 
strategies or coherent assessments. Again Ghana forestry illustrates.
The Bank broadly backs Ghana's long rotation/sustainable replanting 
approach to closed forest management and its use of incentives to enhanced 
pre-export processing. It has provided some credits which have been 
crucial to both and is presumably willing to evaluate further proposals.
But some forestry sector deductions from its macroeconomic market freeing 
policy are in fact at variance with implementation of the two pronged 
strategy. The Bank has proposed shorter duration logging concessions with
no right either of first refusal or meeting highest offer at subsequent
tender for new/extended concessions. Shorter concessions create incentives 
for less selective logging and for doing as little forest 
protection/replanting as possible. So does not giving a firm which has 
protected and replanted either an option to renew or to meet the highest 
bid if new lenders are called at the end of each 25 years period.
The Bank also opposes restraints on raw log exports which Ghana has used to
limit wasteful cutting of certain species and to encourage sawmilling and 
veneer production. In practice, the Bank has accepted Ghanaian arguments
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but more by turning a blind eye than reaching a formal agreement on guide­
lines .
A related issue concerns monitoring export prices - which the Bank may not 
oppose in principle but in practice would object to almost any conceivable 
institutional follow-up. The problem is contextual. The plurality of 
logging and milling is in the hands of a minority, citizen (multi passport) 
community. Their traditional family economic life style involves 
expatriating profits (investible surplus) and often themselves to the 
overseas invested surplus on retirement. This poses severe macroeconomic 
flow problems for Ghana. Given the existence of capital account exchange 
control, it results in frequent massive transfer pricing (often to family 
member firms abroad) with negative fiscal and forex problems. It is also 
an objective fact that these firms are - in a majority of cases - 
slaughter cutters not sustainable foresters and with the impending 
exhaustion of stool lands are making a push to get into "closed" forests by 
short term/winner take all concession tendering (probably with agreed rings 
rigging bids where no large foreign, joint venture or indigenous firms seem 
likely challengers). This is, in the context of Ghana an ecological set of 
issues not just a set of ethnic tensions. The Bank could enter into 
dialogue on the expatriation of investible surplus by citizens - transfer 
pricing (at least in terms of fiscal impact) - enterprise bad practice 
fronts without becoming involved on the ethnic front but to date appears to 
have avoided doing so.
The conclusions available from a review of economies - ecology and 
structural adjustment are not new nor unique to environmental issues:
■ economic analysis is a useful (but limited) servant but a tyrannical 
master
■ marrying natural and social scientific analyses and approaches is 
potentially fruitful but usually time consuming and rarely easy
■ market mechanisms (even in support of non-market goals) may be useful, 
low cost instruments so long as they are perceived as that and no more
■ while the World Bank should be concerned with ecological/environmental 
issues (especially as they relate to sustained development) it is not a 
plausible proxy World Environmental Adjudication Organisation
42
■ that structural adjustment and environmental protection are both 
important (albeit in rather different ways since the former is 
primarily about medium term means and the latter relates to long term 
ends) does imply mutual recognition and attempts to achieve consistency 
but not that the two should be amalgamated
■ using overall financial leverage to force policy changes not directly 
related to nor necessary for the effective use of the proposed 
transfers is normatively highly problematic and practically Southern 
animosity generating in potentially counter-productive ways.
VIII.
Explorations Toward Sustainable Progress
That ecology is on major agendas is no longer in doubt. That the current 
combination of apocalyptic presentations, separation of human and 'natural* 
environmental issues, diatribes of the deaf and attempted coercive action 
by many parties is a sustainable way to achieve environmental protection 
and rehabilitation is very much in question.
Certain guide-lines toward a more fruitful set of dialogue and negotiations 
which would both broaden the base of support for ecological initiatives and 
create a context more conducive to positive action include:
1. Treating ecology as an aspect of environment embracing the human 
(including livelihood and quality of life) aspects as well as the 
natural.
2. Articulating a Right To Survival relating to global emission levels, 
local-national-regional environment disintegration menaces, species 
diversity and shared responsibility over time for rendering the right 
effective.
3. Relating the Right To Survival to Right To Development at local, 
national, regional and global levelB via sustainability.
4. Accepting that livelihoods are key to survival and that, therefore, 
ecological protection approaches hostile to present and short run
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household or national livelihood concerns have little chance of 
sustained implementation.
5. Realisation that both priorities (which environmental threats are most 
urgent and damaging) and perspectives (by location and occupation) on 
environmental issues vary legitimately with none having a monopoly of 
normative right or objective wisdom.
6. Acceptance of the fact of uncertainty as well as of that of danger in 
respect to most ecological threats and of the validity of social as 
well as natural science concerns, instruments and processes.
7. Recognition of the realities that the bulk of environmental damage has 
been done by rich countries whose per capita ecologically damaging 
actions (at home and abroad) remain dominant, but also that rapid 
industrialisation without environmental protection in poor countries 
will have very serious negative consequences globally as well as 
nationally.
8. Resulting - given the implausibility (normatively or practicably) of 
halting industrialisation in the South - in a global need to make 
effective, affordable access to eco-friendly technology available in 
both South and North.
9. Moving to the construction from the bottom up of local and national 
environmental agendas to complement top down global and regional ones 
with both processes taking livelihood considerations into account.
10. Creation of sets of negotiating fora based on:
a. acceptance of common environmental concerns;
b. and the need for coordinated actions;
c. including cost sharing transfer payments from richer (and 
potentially disproportionately benefiting) to poorer countries and 
communities.
11. Initially proceeding in a set of fora with a few global — e.g. in 
respect to ozone layer rehabilitation and global warming control - and 
others regional or bilateral to achieve early forward momentum.
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12. But also seeking to institutionalise the environmental protection 
process including evaluation of threats and instruments to meet them 
and monitoring in order to set guide-lines and contexts for 
negotiations.
13. And based on clear recognition that resource constraints are 
ecologically destructive (e.g. to forest and land in the level of poor 
households; to forest preservation and sustainable management at that 
of poor countries) but that, when resources are deployed to make 
sustainability consistent with improved livelihood in the short as well 
as the longer run, a much broader participation can and does ensue 
yielding results which cannot be achieved simply by proscription and 
coercion.
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